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PATENT DEDICATION AS ANTITRUST REMEDY:
NEW LIGHT ON HARTFORD-EMPIRE*
ANTITRUST decrees are directed toward curing the effects of unlawful
conduct and thereby restoring competitive conditions.' The aggregation or
exploitation of patents may violate the antitrust laws,2 and patents are sub-
ject to regulation by antitrust decree.3 However, patents are a form of
property.4 Conflict has therefore developed concerning the power of courts,
in the event of proved patent abuse, to decree forfeiture of patent rights by
such substantially similar remedies as compulsory royalty-free licensing " or
dedication to the public,( even when necessary to restore competition.
In the leading case of Hartford-Empire Co. v. Uvited States7 the Supreme
Court considered the remedy of compulsory royalty-free licensing. Hartford,
a patent development company," acquired control over 600 patents on glass
*United States v. General Electric Co., 115 F. Supp. 835 (D.N.J. 1953).
1. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 91 F. Supp. 333, 340 (S.D.N.Y.
1950) ; accord, United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 340 U.S. 76, 88 (1950); United States
v. Crescent Amusement Co., 323 U.S. 173, 186 (1944). See Marcus, Patent., Antitrust
Laws and Antitrust J dgments Through Hartford-Einpire, 34 GEo. L.J. 1, 36-51 (1945).
2. United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287, 303 (1948) ; International Salt
Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 396 (1947) ; Standard Oil Co. of Indiana v. United
States, 283 U.S. 163, 169 (1931). For general discussion of antitrust limitations upon
the exploitation of patents, see DIcGIXS & NrrscHrm, PA=m.T PRAcricEns U ,Dm THm
ANTITRUST LAWs (Practising Law Institute, 1951); Meyers & Lewis, The Patent
"Fra-whise" and the Antitrust Lazwes, 30 GEo. L.J. 117, 260 (1941); Seegert, Patent
Licensing by Judicial Action, 47 AicuH. L REv. 613 (1949); Note, 50 Co. L Ruv. 476
(1950).
3. See, e.g., Besser Mfg. Co. v. United States, 343 U.S. 444 (1952) (compulsory
licensing at reasonable royalties); Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United States, 309 U.S. 436
(1940) (injunction against use of restrictive license agreements); Standard Sanitary
Mfg. Co. v. United States, 226 U.S. 20 (1912) (injunction against price fixing).
4. Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386, 415 (1945); Continental
Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 425 (1903); E. Bement & Sons
v. National Harrow Co., 186 U.S. 70, 90 (1902).
5. Under compulsory royalty-free patent licensing, as under any form of licensing,
the patentee retains title to his patents, see United States v. General Electric Co., 272
U.S. 476, 499 (1926) ; Pope Mfg. Co. v. Gormully & Jeffery Mfg. Co., 144 U.S. 248, 252
(1892), but is prevented from realizing any royalties from them, United States v.
Vehicular Parking, Ltd., 61 F. Supp. 656 (D. Del. 1945). See 22 Gm. WASHr. L REV.
257,260 (1953).
6. Under dedication to the public, the patentee permanently loses his entire rights
to his patents, the patents becoming public property. Ibid. See generally Scott Paper
Co. v. Marcalus Alfg. Co., 326 U.S. 249 (1945) (expiration of patents effects dedication
to public) ; 66 STAT. 809, 35 U.S.C. § 253 (Supp. 1952) (statutory procedure for volun-
tary dedication).
7. 323 U.S. 386, clarified, 324 U.S. 570 (1945).
8. Id. at 3934.
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machinery.9 By restrictive cross-licensing agreements with the leading glass
manufacturers,' 0 it set up a patent pool which regimented the production and
price policies of the glass container industry," in violation of Sections 1 and 2
of the Sherman Act. 12 However, the Supreme Court modified a district court
decree of royalty-free licensing 13 to provide for reasonable royalties,"4 on the
ground that royalty-free licensing amounted to confiscation of patent prop-
erty.'9 Following Hartford-Empire, district courts refused under any cir-
cumstances to decree compulsory licensing without royalties."0 The case thus
came to stand for the proposition that royalty-free licensing was confiscatory
per se.
9. Id. at 400. The district court found that this aggregation of patents had been
acquired by the potent threat of patent litigation and the outlay of large sums of money,
as part of a concerted scheme to control the industry. 46 F. Supp. 541, 618-19 (N.D.
Ohio 1942). Moreover, one of Hartford's most important patents had been obtained by
fraud. Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238, 250 (1944).
10. Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386, 393-9 (1945).
11. Ninety-four percent of the glass containers manufactured on the two principal types
of glass-making machinery was produced on machinery licensed under the pooled patents,
which thus "effectually controlled the industry." Id. at 400. Additional licenses were
refused to prevent overstocking of the glassware market and thus achieve price "stabili-
zation." Id. at 398. Exclusive production rights to particular types of containers were
allocated. Id. at 400.
12. 26 STAT. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1946). United States v. Hartford-Empire
Co., 46 F. Supp. 541, 617 (N.D. Ohio 1942), modified on other grounds, 323 U.S. 386,
401 (1945).
13. Id. at 621. In addition the court decreed cancellation of existing restrictive leases
and licenses, and decreed receivership for Hartford pendente lite. Id. at 620-21.
14. Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386, 417, clarified, 324 U.S.
570 (1945).
15. "Since the provisions ...in effect confiscate considerable portions of the ap-
pellants' property, we think they go beyond what is required to dissolve the combination
and prevent future combinations of like character." Id. at 414. The Court also terminated
the receivership. Id. at 411.
Since Hartford-Empire, the remedy of compulsory patent licensing at reasonable
royalties has been well recognized and frequently employed in antitrust decrees. See, e.g.,
Besser Mfg. Co. v. United States, 343 U.S. 444, 449 (1952) ; United States v. U.S. Gyp-
sum Co., 340 U.S. 76, 94 (1950). It is sometimes difficult to determine reasonableness,
however. United States v. National Lead Co., 332 U.S. 319, 349 (1947). One articulated
standard of reasonableness is that royalty figure which permits "continuous competition"
between patentee and licensee. United States v. Hartford-Empire Co., 65 F. Supp. 271,
274 (N.D. Ohio 1946). Royalties paid in the past, although not conclusive of reason-
ableness, provide "guidance." United States v. National Lead, supra at 350. Most de-
crees provide that the patentee and licensees may agree on the reasonableness of royalty
payments, with the court deciding the question only in the event of disagreement. See,
e.g., United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., supra; United States v. Vehicular Parking, Ltd.,
74 F. Supp. 4 (D. Del. 1947).
16. United States v. Imperial Chemical Industries, Ltd., 100 F. Supp. 504 (1951)
(division of world market in explosives and chemicals by exclusive patent licenses and
technological exchange), final decree entered, 105 F. Supp. 215, 225 (S.D.N.Y. 1952)
(compulsory licensing at reasonable royalties decreed) ; United States v. Vehicular Park-
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In United States v. National Lead Co., 17 the Supreme Court suggested a
weakening of this apparently sweeping interdiction. National Lead, du Pont,
and others were held to have violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act by
their division of the world titanium market 18 through cross-licensing of exist-
ing and future patents.19 A district court decree providing for compulsory
licensing at reasonable royalties 2 0 was affirmed as an exercise of "sound
judicial discretion."' 21 However, the Court implied that royalty-free licensing
might be permissible where "necessary and appropriate" for antitrust en-
forcement.'
ing, Ltd., 54 F. Supp. 828 (1944) (monopolization of parking meter business by assign-
ment of competing patents to patent holding company followed by restrictive licenses),
final decree entered, 61 F. Supp. 656 (D. Del. 1945) (compulsory licensing at reason-
able royalties decreed). See 14 FoRD. L. REv. 91 (1945).
17. 332 U.S. 319 (1947).
13. United States v. National Lead Co., 63 F. Supp. 513, 527 (S.D.N.Y. 1945), aff'd,
332 U.S. 319 (1947). By means of this division, National Lead and du Pont obtained
complete control of the American titanium market. Subsequently they licensed two
smaller firms, controlling 10 percent of the domestic market, under royalties and "severe"
tonnage limitations. Id. at 517, 531-2.
19. United States v. National Lead, 332 U.S. 319, 328 (1947). For the terms of the
license and technological exchange agreements see 63 F. Supp. 513, 517, 520 (S.D.N.Y.
1945). The "proliferation" of patents controlled by the pool greatly impeded entry into
the titanium field. Id. at 532.
20. Id. at 534. Compulsory roy alty-free licensing was apparently refused wholly on
the authority of Harford-Emp2re. United States v. National Lead Co., 332 U.S. 319, 365
n.2 (1947). In addition to being required to grant uniform non-discriminatory patent
licenses to all applicants, defendants were enjoined from carrying out their restrictive
agreements and were required to divulge their titanium "Imow-how" for three years at
reasonable fees. 63 F. Supp. 513, 534 (S.D.N.Y. 1945).
21. 332 U.S. 319, 338 (1947). The district court's refusal to order divestiture by
National Lead and du Pont of half of their titanium producing facilities was also affirmed.
Id. at 353.
District court decrees in antitrust cases have received varying degrees of appellate
review. The Supreme Court has treated several recent decrees on the theory that wide
discretion rests with the district court in the formulation of decrees, subject to reversal
or modification only if the decree fails adequately to protect the public interest in the
light of the violations found. United States v. Crescent Amusement Co., 323 U.S. 173,
185 (1944) ; accord, Besser 'Mfg. Co. v. United States, 343 U.S. 444, 449 (1952) ; Inter-
national Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 400 (1947). In several other cases, how-
ever, the Court has freely intervened to modify "inappropriate" provisions in the decree.
See, e.g., United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 340 U.S. 76, 89 (1950); United States v.
Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131. (194S) ; Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States,
323 U.S. 386, clarified, 324 U.S. 570 (1945).
22. United States v. National Lead Co., 332 U.S. 319, 349 (1947). The types of cir-
cumstances under which royalty-free licensing might be a permissible remedy were not
specified. See 32 MINN. L REv. 309, 311 (194). The majority of four refused to re-
affirm Hartford-Empire even though it might easily have done so. A minority of three
would have overruled it so as dearly to establish the principle that royalty-free licensing
was permissible where necessary. Thus the effect of Hartford-Empire was weakened.
See 36 GEo. L.J. 272, 276 (1948).
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In the recent case of United States v. General Electric Co.,23 a district
court, taking up the Supreme Court's suggestion, decreed patent dedication
for the first time.24 GE, by virtue of its dominant position in the incandescent
lamp industry,25 forced its licensees under expiring basic lamp patents to
take out licenses on its improvement patents.20 The licenses prohibited GE's
principal competitor, Westinghouse, from selling lamps below the GE price,
27
and granted each licensee a production quota based on a percentage of GE's
net sales.28 In addition, the licensees paid substantial royalties 20 and agreed
to grant licenses to GE on any of their own improvement patents. 0 As a
result, GE and its licensees presented an "almost impregnable front" against
23. 115 F. Supp. 835 (1953) (decree), irnplernenting 82 F. Supp. 753 (D.N.J. 1949)
(decision on merits).
24. 115 F. Supp. 835, 843 (D.N.J. 1953). See 54 COL. L. REv. 278 (1954). United
States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 91 F. Supp. 333 (S.D.N.Y. 1950), was the case here-
tofore most closely approaching the result of royalty-free licensing by judicial decree.
There, improvement grant-back provisions which may have been the sole consideration
for royalty-free patent licenses on aluminum processes issued by Alcoa to Reynolds and
Kaiser were declared unenforceable as part of a decree implementing a holding of
monopolization in 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945). The court felt that retention of the
grant-back provisions would give Alcoa a marked technological advantage over its com-
petitors. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 91 F. Supp. at 410. But see United
States v. Imperial Chemical Industries, Ltd., 105 F. Supp. 215, 224 (S.D.N.Y. 1952),
interpreting Alcoa as not being precedent for royalty-free licensing because Alcoa re-
ceived other consideration in addition to the grant-backs.
Remedies of both dedication and royalty-free licensing have frequently been utilized
in consent decrees. See, e.g., United States v. Sand Spun Patents Corp., 1948-1949
TRADE CAsES ff 62,462 (D.N.J. 1949) (patent dedication); United States v. U.S. Pipe
& Foundry Co., id. 162,285 (D.N.J. 1948) (same); United States v. Rail Joint Co.,
1944-1945 id. 157,287 (N.D. Ill. 1944) (same); United States v. Parke, Davis & Co.,
1950-1951 id. 1 62,914 (D. Mich. 1951.) (royalty-free licensing) ; United States v. Owens-
Coming Fiberglas Corp., 1948-1949 id. 1 62,442 (N.D. Ohio 1949) (same) ; United States
v. Bendix Aviation Corp., id f 62,349 (S.D.N.Y. 1948) (same).
25. United States v. General Electric Co., 82 F. Supp. 753, 900 (D.N.J. 1949).
26. Id. at 776, 813, 883. In United States v. General Electric Co., 272 U.S. 476
(1926), relied upon strongly by GE in the instant case, GE's three basic incandescent
lamp patents were held sufficiently controlling to justify a GE license to Westinghouse
providing for fixing of lamp prices and sales restrictions.
As used in the opinions, the term "lamp" refers only to the incandescent filament
lamp bulb. See United States v. General Electric Co., 115 F. Supp. 835, 840 (D.N.J.
1953).
27. 82 F. Supp. 753, 809 (D.N.J. 1949). GE's licenses to the smaller lamp manu-
facturers specifically provided against price restrictions, id. at 880, but any significant
departure from the GE price would have been "disastrous" to the firms involved. Id. at
881.
28. Id. at 776, 875. The smaller firms were limited to the manufacture of either large
or miniature lamps; Westinghouse was permitted to manufacture both types. Id. at 809.
29. Royalties paid by Westinghouse and the smaller lamp firms were set at 1 per-
cent and 3Y, percent, respectively, of their net sales of lamps covered by their licenses.
Id. at 809, 874.
30. Id. at 874. Westinghouse was exempted from this requirement. Id. at 767.
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the other firms in the incandescent lamp field.3 ' The court found that GE
with its licensees had both acquired 32 and utilized 33 patents in violation of
Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, thereby monopolizing the industry3 4
In the light of these violations, defendants were enjoined from carrying out
any of their existing licenses 35 and from agreeing to allocate markets, limit
production, or fix prices. 36 In addition, the decree required dedication of all
existing patents 37 on lamps and lamp parts,38 together with the furnishing
by GE of technological information for three years.30 However, the court
refused to divest GE of one-half of its incandescent lamp facilities.40 It found
31. Id. at 893.
32. GE's aggregation of patents in order to perpetuate its control over the incandes-
cent lamp industry after its basic patents had expired was not only an unlawful monopoli-
zation in itself but was one of the instruments through which GE monopolized the in-
dustry. Id. at 816-17.
33. GE's improvement patents were held insufficient to sustain its license restrictions
on the completed lamps. Id. at 815, 901. GE and its licensees were held to have con-
spired to restrain competition in the incandescent lamp industry. Id. at 873, 8M. The
smaller manufacturers, as favored beneficiaries of GF, were held to be co-conspirators
even though there was evidence that they had not acceded willingly to GE's license re-
strictions. Acquiescence in an illegal scheme violates the antitrust laws as much as the
promotion of one. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 161 (1948)
(theater chains forced discriminatory contracts on movie producers).
34. United States v. General Electric Co., 82 F. Supp. 753, 817, 902 (D.N.J. 1949).
35. 115 F. Supp. 835, 842 (D.N.J. 1953).
36. Id. at 860.
37. The term "patents" v'as broadly defined to include existing patents plus pending
patent applications. Id. at 840.
38. Id. at 843. Pursuant to the terms of the decree, GE dedicated 177 existing patents
and 38 pending patent applications on lamps and lamp parts. Dedication to the Public
of General Electric Incandescent Lamp and Lamp Parts Patents, recorded, United States
Patent Office (January 1954), Civil Action No. 1364, United States v. General Electric
Co., (D.N.J. 1953). The decree was effective primarily with respect to patents acquired
by GE since the commencement of the suit, since the most recent parts patent upon
which GE based its original licenses was to expire in January 1954. 82 F. Supp. 753, 803
(D.N.J. 1949).
GE and its licensees were also ordered to grant licenses to all applicants at reasonable
royalties on their lamp machinery patents. 115 F. Supp. 835, 846 (D.N.J. 1953). The
court held that the monopoly of the incandescent lamp industry had been maintained
largely by GE's improvement patents on lamps and lamp parts rather than by its
machinery patents. Id. at 844.
A consent decree similar to the General Electric decree was entered against Vest-
inghouse in 1942. BRIGHT, THE ELtcm~c-LAim INDUsnY 289 (1949).
39. 115 F. Supp. 835, 853 (D.N.J. 1953). This 'kow-how" vras to include blue-
prints and descriptions of incandescent lamp processes and machinery, and was to be made
available at cost. Ibid. Compulsory granting of "know-how," often as important as the
patents to which it relates, has customarily been decreed in conjunction with compulsory
patent licensing. See, e.g., United States v. Imperial Chemical Industries, Ltd., 105 F.
Supp. 215, 227 (S.D.N.Y. 1952); United States v. National Lead Co., 63 F. Supp. 513,
534 (S.D.N.Y. 1945), aff'd, 332 U.S. 319 (1947).
40. United States v. General Electric Co., 115 F. Supp. 835, 871 (D.N.J. 1953).
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divestiture unnecessary to restore competitive conditions in the lamp industry,
since the principal antitrust violations would be corrected by other provisions
of the decree.
41
While General Electric's mandate of dedication goes farther than the de-
crees in the two Supreme Court cases, 42 it seems well justified by the eco-
nomic structure of the incandescent lamp industry. 43 GE, earning 90 percent
of industry profits, 44 towered above its competitors in size and market con-
trol.45 In view of the narrow profit margin in lamp production, 40 the pay-
ment of even reasonable royalties by its weaker competitors would significant-
ly decrease their profits and increase GE's already sizable competitive ad-
vantage. 47 Thus royalties could well be a critical factor in the growth or
limitation of competition. Moreover, GE had a substantial advantage over
the other lamp manufacturers in research and technology. 48  Granting them
patents and "know-how" would provide the means for the smaller firms to
catch up to GE in these respects.49 Once having caught up, they could more
41. Ibid. Other factors cited by the court in refusing divestiture were the existence
of healthy competitors, the impracticability of splitting up GE's fully integrated manu-
facturing facilities, and the harmful effects which divestiture might have upon lamp re-
search and national security. Id. at 870-1.
42. The district court was affirmed when it decreed reasonable royalties, United
States v. National Lead Co., 332 U.S. 319, 351 (1947), and reversed when it decreed
royalty-free licensing, Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386, 417 (1945).
43. An injunction against continuation of past restrictive practices is a necessary
adjunct to a patent antitrust decree. See, e.g., United States v. National Lead Co., 63
F. Supp. 513, 534 (S.D.N.Y. 1945), aff'd, 332 U.S. 319 (1947) ; United States v. Imperial
Chemical Industries, Ltd., 105 F. Supp. 215, 220 (.S.D.N.Y. 1952). However, such an
injunction would not eliminate GE's patent monopoly or its technological and research
advantage. Cf. Schine ,Chain Theatres v. United States, 334 U.S. 110, 128 (1948) ; United
States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 185 (1911).
44. United States v. General Electric Co., 115 F. Supp. 835, 863 (D.N.J. 1953).
45. In 1949, for example, GE's percentage share of dollar sales of incandescent
lamps within the United States was 57.1 percent, compared with 23.0 percent for Westing-
house, 9.8 percent for Sylvania, and 3.4 percent for Tung-Sol, its nearest competitors.
Id. at 882. However, its 1949 lamp profits before taxes were $36,000,000, compared with
$1,400,000 for Westinghouse, $230,000 for Sylvania, and $680,000 for Tung-Sol. Id. at 869.
46. Id. at 844.
47. Assuming that the royalty schedules established by GE, note 29 supra, were
operative in 1949, GE would have received $1,100,000 in total royalties from its licensees.
Westinghouse would have paid $340,000 and Tung-Sol, $170,000 in royalties, equivalent
to approximately 25 percent of the profits of each before taxes. Sylvania would have
paid $480,000 in royalties, over 200 percent of its profits before taxes. See Table 1,
id. at 882.
48. Id. at 848. GE's expenditures for research between 1927 and 1940 of more than
$25,000,000 dwarfed all the efforts of its competitors. 82 F. Supp. 753, 858 (D.N.J,
1949).
49. See note 39 supra. Another device to overcome GE's technological momentum
and more nearly equalize research facilities was the requirement that GE alone grant
licenses at reasonable royalties for all patents acquired within the next five years. United
States v. General Electric Co., 115 F. Supp. 835, 848 (D.N.J. 1953). Cf. United States
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easily maintain or improve their competitive position since, in the technologi-
cally mature incandescent lamp industry, future development is likely to be
limited.50 Finally, dedication could accomplish these results with a minimum
of loss to GE, certainly less than divestiture would entail.r1 GE was pri-
marily a manufacturer, to whom the income from lamp patent royalties was
not of critical importance.5 2  Moreover, many of the dedicated patents were
unimportant or unused.5 3 And GE had already suspended its licenses and
royalties voluntarily eight years before the decree was handed down.'
Analysis of National Lead provides sound reasons for holding that its
decree of compulsory licensing at reasonable royalties is not inconsistent with
General Electric. The patents in National Lead had been validly acquired
and later misused in the patent pool; there was no illegal aggregation of
patents in one firm upon cancellation of the licenses, as there was in General
Electric.5  Moreover, in contrast to General Electric, the two principal
titanium producers, National Lead and du Pont, were strong enough to
counterbalance each other and were in active competition, 0 while the two
smaller firms were healthy and growing.W7 Therefore, in terms of both the
character of the offense and conditions in the industry, royalty payments
were probably justified.53
v. Aluminum Co. of America, 91 F. Supp. 333, 410 (S.D.N.Y. 1950) (improvement
grant-backs to Alcoa declared unenforceable so as to stimulate the research of its
competitors.)
50. BRIGHT, THE ELEcrTmc-LAmp I-NusTRY, 4534 (1949).
51. See United States v. General Electric Co., 115 F. Supp. 835, 870-1 (D.N.J. 1953).
52. See notes 45, 47 supra.
53. 82 F. Supp. 753, 809, 813 (D.N.J. 1949).
54. BRIGHT, op. cit. supra note 50, at 294-5. The pending antitrust action against
GE probably had a significant effect in bringing about this suspension. From 1946 to 1950,
after the license restrictions had been removed, GE's share of the domestic incandescent
lamp market declined from 58.8 to 54.1 percent, while the share of its three nearest com-
petitors increased from 28.5 to 39.1 percent. 115 F. Supp. 835, 82 (D.N.J. 1953).
The fact that defendants have abandoned their illegal practices does not prevent courts
from enjoining such activity or ordering such other decrees as will prevent their re-
currence. United States v. Crescent Amusement Co., 323 US. 173, 186 (1944); United
States v. Pullman Co., 50 F. Supp. 123, 136 (E.D. Pa. 1943), aff'd, 330 U.S. 806 (1947) ;
United States v. Hartford-Empire Co., 46 F. Supp. 541, 617-18 (N.D. Ohio 1942), vedi-
fled on. other grounds, 323 U.S. 386 (1945).
55. United States v. National Lead Co., 63 F. Supp. 513 (S.D.N.Y. 1945), aff'd,
332 U.S. 319 (1947).
56. 332 U.S. 319, 348 (1947). National Lead, with assets of $100,000,000, produced
46.4 percent of TiO, and 76.5 percent of composite titanium pigments produced in the
United States. du Pont, with assets of over $1,000,000,000, produced 45.1 percent of TiO,
and 23.5 percent of composite pigments. Id. at 339.
57. Id. at 348. The growth of the two smaller firms had taken place in spite of their
royalty payments. Id. at 351. Moreover, each of them was a subsidiary of a larger
corporation. Id. at 352.
58. There are, however, some reasons for believing that royalty-free licensing might
legitimately have been decreed in National Lead. There were, in the first place, no
royalty payments involved in the original cross-licensing agrmements. 63 F. Supp. 513,
1954]
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Hartford-Empire's decree of reasonable royalties, viewed in the context
of the glass container industry, is also reconcilable with General Electric.
Hartford, a patent holding and development company, had no substantial
sources of income except patent royalties. 9 The severe weakening of Hart-
ford through royalty-free licensing would have hurt the smaller glass manu-
facturers, which relied heavily on its research facilities and machinery. In
contrast, the two largest glass manufacturers, Owens and Hazel-Atlas, were
fully integrated in this respect. 0 Even though Hartford's coercive practices
in acquiring and utilizing its patent monopoly might have justified royalty-
free licensing, such a remedy would probably have hindered competition in
the industry.
In view of the foregoing economic analysis, the three decrees appear both
consistent and reasonable. Hartford-Empire may well have held royalty-free
licensing confiscatory not because it exceeded the limits of remedial power
per se but because it went beyond what was required under the circum-
stances :61 competition in the glass container industry could have been, and
therefore should have been restored by remedies less severe than royalty-free
licensing. 2 Decrees imposing unnecessary or inappropriate impairment of
517, 527 (S.D.N.Y. 1945). However, after the district court decree, see text at note 20
supra, du Pont demanded royalties from National Lead. This caused National Lead,
as well as the Government, to request royalty-free licensing on appeal. 32 MINx. L.
Rwv. 309 (1948). Reasonable royalties might well have had the effect of placing all
titanium producers at a competitive disadvantage with respect to du Pont. See 332 U.S.
319, 367-9 (1947) (dissenting opinion). See Zlinkoff & Barnard, The Supreme Court
and a Competitive Economy: 1946 Tern, 47 CoL L. Rxv. 914, 941-2 (1947). Any eco-
nomic inequities in National Lead may be partly explained by the broad view of district
court discretion taken by the Supreme Court. See note 21 supra.
59. Comment, Compulsory Patent Licensing by Antitrust Decree, 56 YALe. L.J. 77,
102-104 (1946). Moreover, many of Hartford's patents were basic patents on glass-
making machinery. Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386, 393-400 (1945).
In addition, royalty payments could not give Hartford a competitive advantage over its
licensees since it did no manufacturing.
60. Comment, supra note 59. Several of Hartford's licensees filed a brief in the
Supreme Court as amici curiae, claiming that Hartford's continued services both as a
supplier of machinery and research organization were essential to them in their competi-
tion with the larger companies. Brief on Behalf of Certain Medium Sized Glass Manu-
facturing Companies, with Respect to the Remedy, pp. 9, 11, Hartford-Empire Co. v.
United States, 323 U.S. 386 (1945).
61. Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386, 414 (1945). The court
admittedly did not substantiate its view that the combination in Hartford-Empire could be
dissolved without requiring forfeiture of patent property by a factual analysis of the
glass container industry. For an argument that if royalty-free licensing had been
necessary there to enforce the antitrust laws, it should have been decreed, see Note, 45
Co. L. RE v. 601, 623 (1945).
62. The rationale that a harsh remedy may not be invoked when other measures are
sufficient for antitrust enforcement has been used to deny remedies of both royalty-
free licensing, United States v. National Lead -Co., 332 U.S. 319, 349 (1947), and divesti-
ture, Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593, 601, 603 (1951);
United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 446 (2d Cir. 1945); 91 F.
Supp. 333, 418 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
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property rights are subject to reversal as much on the constitutional grounds
of confiscation of property without due process as on abuse of discretion.c0
General Electric construes Hartford-Em pire, read together with National
Lead, as making no sweeping prohibition of dedication or royalty-free licens-
ing. It establishes a double requirement for dedication: if the essence of anti-
trust violation is monopolization of patents, 4 and if the complete elimination
of that monopoly is the key to restoration of competitive conditions,O then
dedication is a permissible remedy.
Interpreting Hartford-Empire to mean that a deprivation of royalties is
per se confiscatory seems unsoundP0 A court can decree divestiture or dis-
63. Compare Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386, 412-14 (1945)
(royalty-free licensing and compulsory machinery sale provisions confiscatory), uilth
Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593, 601, 603 (1951) (divestiture
unnecessary). See also Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1,
81 (1911) ; Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 358 (1904) (district
court decrees upheld, therefore stockholders not deprived of property rights).
Recent defendant antitrust appeals have usually ignored the confiscation issue, arguing
solely that particular district court decrees were improperly decreed. See, e.g., Schine
Chain Theatres, Inc. v. United States, 334 U.S. 110, 126 (1948) (divestiture) ; Interna-
tional Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 393 (1947) (compulsory sale and leasing
of machinery). But see Besser Mfg. Co. v. United States, 343 U.S. 444, 447 (1952)
(method for determining royalties claimed confiscatory).
64. General Electric apparently limits its approval of dedication to cases finding
violations of both sections 1 and 2; ICI, supra note 16, was distinguished on the ground
that it involved only section 1 violations. United States v. General Electric Co., 115
F. Supp. 835, 844 (D.NJ. 1953). However, from the standpoint of those firms who are
forced to accept restrictive licenses, it little matters whether the patent restrictions are
being practiced by a combination of firms operating out of a patent pool as in Arational
Lead, or whether the patents have been illegally monopolized by a single firm and the
restraints practiced by it alone as in General Electric. In both instances dedication
should be available if necessary to restore competition.
65. The severity of patent abuses in the form of illegal aggregation or license
restraints is a relevant factor in determining whether dedication is required as a means
of deterring a repetition of the unlawful conduct. Cf. United States v. Crescent Amuse-
ment Co., 323 U.S. 173, 186 (1944); United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 117
(1932). However, since the civil sanctions of the Sherman Act are remedial rather than
punitive, United States v. National Lead Co., 332 U.S. 319, 333 (1947), dedication would
not be decreed, regardless of the severity of the patent abuses, where it would be unneces-
sary or detrimental to the restoration of competition. See text at notes 59-60 supra.
66. District courts are vested with broad powers under section 4 of the Sherman
Act to "prevent and restrain" violations of the act. 26 STAT. 209 (1S90), 15 U.S.C.
§ 4 (1946). Under these powers a court may make any order necessary to bring
about the dissolution or supression of an illegal combination. Northern Securities Co.
v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 357 (1904). And the impairment of other types of prop-
erty rights has been held to be no bar to the fashioning of an effective decree. United
States v. Union Pacific R.R., 226 U.S. 470, 477 (1913). Cf. United States v. Joint-
Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505, 571 (1S98). See Marcus, Patents, Antitrust Laws an:d Anti-
trust Jvdgmnts Through Hartford-Empire, 34 GEO. L.J. 1, 43 (1945).
The argument has been advanced that royalty-free licensing is ut a permissible
remedy since Congress has rejected a number of proposals to cancel patents which have
been used to violate the antitrust laws. Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S.
1954]
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solution in appropriate cases despite hardship and economic loss. 7 It seems
clear that patent dedication is a less severe remedy than divestiture. 8 There-
fore to argue that the former is confiscatory while the latter is permissible
is to set artificial limits on district court remedial power. There is no reason
why a patent monopolist should have the vested right to receive the benefits
of his unlawful acts through royalties.69 Moreover, since the Supreme Court
has indicated that reasonable royalties may be fixed at nominal amounts,7"
the step to royalty-free licensing is a small one.71 In the sense that all anti-
trust decrees deprive violators of their power to earn monopoly profits, all
are confiscatory. The issue raised by the dedication of GE's monopolized
patents is therefore not a novel one except in form. In view of the other
alternatives, patent dedication was the least severe and least confiscatory
approach to the restoration of competition in the incandescent lamp industry.
72
386, 416 (1945). In view of the broad remedial powers which courts already possess,
the refusal to enact a specific remedy does not seem persuasive either way. Moreover,
the failure of Congress to enact proposals for compulsory patent licensing at reasonable
royalties has not prevented courts from decreeing this remedy. See note 15 supra.
67. United States v. Crescent Amusement Co., 323 U.S. 173, 189 (1944) (divestiture
affirmed even when harsh and inequitable income tax wise); United States v. Corn
Products Refining Co., 234 Fed. 964, 1018 (S.D.N.Y. 1916), appeal disnissed, 249 U.S.
621 (1918) (dissolution ordered in spite of loss to stockholders). For a general discus-
sion of the cases in which divestiture or dissolution have been decreed, see 6 TOULMIN,
ANTI-TRUST LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES 972-1070 (1951).
68. United States v. General Electric Co., 115 F. Supp. 835, 843, 865, 871 (D.N.J.
1953) (dedication decreed, more drastic remedy of divestiture denied). Accord, United
.States v. National Lead Co., 332 U.S. 319, 338, 352 (1947) (compulsory licensing at
reasonable royalties decreed, domestic divestiture denied).
69. Cf. Schine Chain Theatres, Inc. v. United States, 334 U.S. 110, 128 (1948)
(divestiture of unlawfully acquired property) ; United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc.,
334 U.S. 131, 171 (1948) (same); United States v. Crescent Amusement Co., 323 U.S.
173, 186-90 (1944) (same). Patent dedication is an application of the "fruits of the con-
spiracy" doctrine to an unlawful aggregation of patents. See Zlinkoff & Barnard, supra
note 58, at 943.
70. United States v. National Lead Co., 332 U.S. 319, 349 (1947), 32 MINN. L. REV.
309, 311 (1948).
71. Even under compulsory licensing at reasonable royalties the patentee forfeits his
property interest in the patent monopoly and his ultimate right to set the amount of the
royalty. See United States v. National Lead Co., 332 U.S. 319, 366 (1947) (dissenting
opinion). If this is not confiscatory, royalty-free licensing and dedication should not be
so considered either, since they are but extensions of the same principle. United States
v. General Electric Co., 115 F. Supp. 835, 844 (D.N.J. 1953), 54 COL. L. REv. 278, 281
(1954).
72. Far from being confiscatory, patent dedication may well have been too mild a
decree. There was evidence that GE's monopoly power emanated not only from its
patents but from its size with respect to its competitors and its control of the manufacture
of essential lamp parts and machinery. United States v. General Electric Co., 82 F. Supp.
753, 893, 900 (D.N.J. 1949). Dedication would have no effect upon these other sources
of monopoly power. See BRIGHT, THE ELECritc-LAMP INDUSTRY, 466 (1949). Moreover,
since there have been no significant improvements in incandescent lamps since 1937,
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Dedication is no more confiscatory than royalty-free licensing, 0 or than
an injunction against the enforcement of patent rights.74 Although, under
the latter two remedies, the patentee retains formal title to his patents,°
he is effectively barred from asserting any right under them, including the
right to receive royalties.7 6 Dedication results in permanent forfeiture of
patent rights,7 7 while a decree of royalty-free licensing might theoretically
be modified 7" to allow royalties upon a showing of changed conditions.7 "
BRIGHT, op. cit. supra at 453-4, the dedicated patents probably were not of crucial
importance.
Nevertheless, dedication destroys GE's remaining patent monopoly and prevents GE
from exercising its other monopoly powers by means of restrictive patent licenses. With
the grant of "know-how," it should stimulate the research development of its competitors.
It should also have a salutary effect upon the practices of GE and its licensees in the
rapidly-expanding fluorescent lamp industry, in which an antitrust suit has ben suspend-
ed pending the termination of the incandescent lamp litigation. See BRIGHT, Op. Cit. supra
at 438-9, 461 (1949).
73. For an argument that dedication amounts to confiscation while royalty-free
licensing merely operates as a suspension of a patentee's rights, see 22 GEo. WASH. L
REv. 257, 260 (1953). However, the decree which was declared "confiscatory" in Hart-
ford-Empire called for royalty-free licensing, not dedication. See text at note 15 mipra.
Moreover, courts have used royalty-free licensing and dedication interchangeably. See,
e.g., Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 3,%, 413, 415 (1945); United States
v. General Electric Co., 115 F. Supp. 835, 8434 (D.N.J. 1953). See also 54 COL L RE%.
278, 279 (1954).
74. For an argument that an injunction against the bringing of infringement suits
would not have involved the constitutional issue of property confiscation inherent in
dedication, see 54 COm. L. REv. 278, 222 (1954). There is precedent for granting such an
injunction. See, e.g., United States v. Vehicular Parking, Ltd., 61 F. Supp. 655 (D. Del.
1945). However, the injunctive remedy and royalty-free licensing have been discussed
interchangeably. See United States v. National Lead Co., 332 U.S. 319, 335-51 (1947);
see also 22 Go. WASH. L Rev. 257, 260 (1953).
75. See United States v. General Electric Co., 272 U.S. 476, 489 (1926); see also
note 5 supra.
76. See Note, 45 Coi- L REv. 601, 618 (1945); 22 GEO. WASH. L. rv.M 257, 20
(1953). But cf. United States v. Vehicular Parking, Ltd., 61 F. Supp. 656 (D. Del. 1945)
semble.
77. Scott Paper Co. v. Marcalus Mfg. Co., 326 U.S. 249 (1945) (dedication upon
statutory expiration of patent) ; Pennock v. Dialogue, 2 Pet. 1, 15 (U.S. 1829) (voluntary
dedication); see note 6 supra.
78. Courts in many recent antitrust cases have retained jurisdiction to modify or
vacate the terms of the decree. See, e.g., United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 340 U.S. 76,
95, 105 (1950); Sugar Institute, Inc. v. United States, 297 U.S. 553, 605 (1936)
(jurisdiction reserved for indefinite period) ; United States v. Imperial Chemical Indus-
tries, Ltd., 105 F. Supp. 215, 220 (S.D.N.Y. 1952); United States v. Aluminum Co. of
America, 91 F. Supp. 333, 418 (S.D.N.Y. 1950) (jurisdiction reserved for five years).
Even without specific retention of jurisdiction, a court of equity has the power to modify
its decree. United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 114 (1932); Western Union
Telegraph Co. v. Int'l Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, 133 F.2d 955, 957 (7th Cir.
1943).
79. See 22 GBo. WASH. L. REv. 257, 260 (1953) ; 32 Minm L Pv. 309, 313 (1943).
Such modification would be in accord with those cases holding that while a violation of
19541
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However, the degree of proof required to demonstrate that a long period of
monopolization or collusive conduct has been eliminated and competition re-
stored is so substantial that there is almost no chance of such a decree being
modified 0 before the expiration of the patents.8 ' With respect to each of
these remedies, the consequences are identical: immediate free access by all
competitors to the offending patents. Courts should have the power to decree
any of them in appropriate cases.
the antitrust laws by a patentee is a defense against a suit by him to restrain patent
infringement, Mercoid Corp. v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 320 US. 680
(1944) ; Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Investment Co., 320 U.S. 661 (1944) ; Morton
Salt Co. v. G. S. Suppiger Co,. 314 U.S. 488 (1942) (patented devices tied in to use of
unpatented products), the patentee may maintain his action once his violation liasi ceased,
Sylvania Industrial Corp. v. Visking Corp., 132 F.2d 947, 958 (4th Cir. 1943). See B. B,
Chemical Co. v. Ellis, 314 U.S. 495, 498 (1942); Standard Oil Co. v. Clark, 163 F.2d
917, 927 (2d Cir. 1947). In contrast to patent monopolization, see note 80 infra, patent
abuses such as tie-in clauses can easily be purged by the patentee. See, e.g., Park-In
Theatres, Inc. v. Loew's Drive-In Theatres, Inc., 70 F. Supp. 880, 887 (D.R.I. 1947).
80. See Zlinkoff & Barnard, The Suprenoe Court and a Competitive Economy: 1946
Term, 47 CoL. L. REv. 914, 943 (1947). A clear showing of grievous wrong evoked by new
and unforeseen circumstances is necessary before what was decreed after years of litigation
will be changed. United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 117, 119 (1932) (modification
of injunction against dealings by meat packers in wholesale groceries denied, in spite of large
growth of grocery chains) ; United States v. Discher, 255 Fed. 719 (S.D.N.Y. 1919) (modi-
fication of injunction against granting joint license on auto bumper patents denied in absence
of convincing proof that this would not restrain competition). A significant passage of
time is necessary before courts will be persuaded that a competitive pattern of relation-
ships has been reestablished. Bigelow v. Balaban & Katz Corp., 199 F.2d 794 (7th Cir.
1952) (modification of injunction against discriminatory movie clearances denied);
United States v. Vehicular Parking, Ltd., 61 F. Supp. 656 (D. Del. 1945) (modification
of injunction against prosecution of patent infringement suits denied). See Comment,
Compulsory Patent Licensing by Antitrust Decree, 56 YALE L.J. 77, 78 (1946). But cf.
Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 335 U.S. 303 (1948) (modification granted of con-
tingent injunction in consent decree against acquisition of control of any finance company,
when similar injunction against GM not obtained).
81. A patentee's exclusive right to make, use, and sell his invention expires after 17
years. 66 STAT. 804 (1952), 35 U.S.C. § 154 (Supp. 1952). The General Electric litiga-
tion, from complaint to decree, consumed 13 years.
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